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It's Time for the Pennsylvania Legislature
to "Get it Together": How Pennsylvania's
Mandatory Seat Belt Law Has Gone
Constitutionally Awry
The object of the . . . legislation would certainly seem to
be one of compelling occupants of motor vehicles to wear seat
belts. This purpose is substantially thwarted if those who ignore the mandate of the statute are permitted to seek and obtain reimbursement for the very injuries caused by the breach
of that duty.'

I. Introduction
According to statistics,2 in 1987, forty-six percent of all accidental deaths in Pennsylvania were attributable to motor vehicle accidents.3 For people between the ages of five and seventy-four, motor
vehicle accidents were the leading cause of accident related fatalities.4 The statistics also indicate that lap and shoulder safety belts

could reduce the chances of fatal or serious injury in motor vehicle
accidents by as much as fifty percent. 5 In response to these statistics,
Pennsylvania's legislature followed the example of other jurisdictions6 and enacted a mandatory seat-belt law.7
1. Loughhead, The Seat Belt Defense in Pennsylvania: It's Time to "Get it Together",
Counterpoint, Oct. 1986, at 1, 5.
2. PA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 1987 PENNSYLVANIA VITAL STATISTICS ANN. REP. (May
1989).
3. Id. at 73.
4. Id.
5. Pauker, Seat Belt Law Works, Pa. L.J. Rep., Oct. 31, 1988, at 2, col. I.
6. Mandatory seat belt laws for adults have been adopted and are in effect in twentyeight states and the District of Columbia. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315 (West Supp. 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-100a (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-1602 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
316.614 (West 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-11.6 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 49-673
(1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1h para. 12-603.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 9-8-14-1 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
8-2503 (Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.1 (West Supp. 1990); MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 22-412.3 (Supp. 1989); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. 257.710e(3) (West Supp. 1988);
MINN. STAT, ANN. § 169.686

(West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-13-103 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.64(2)
(Michie Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2f (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7372(A) (1989); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1299-c (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20135.2A (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.263(B) (Anderson Supp. 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-417 (West Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, §
107c (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-182 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-
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On November 23, 1987, the General Assembly amended its
1983 law on motor vehicle restraint systems.' Amid the clamor sur-

rounding the imposition of a ten dollar fine 9 and the alleged restraint
on individual liberty,"0 the provision most damaging to civil tort litigation went relatively unnoticed. That provision' declares that the
failure to use a seat belt is inadmissible as evidence in any civil trial,
which effectively sounds the death knell for the "seat-belt defense." 2
Unlike other constitutional attacks on seat belt laws, this Com-

ment does not deal with Pennsylvania's authority to create a
mandatory seat belt law. That power is clearly within the realm of
the state's police power. 13 Nor does this Comment deal with a person's right to privacy and the encroachment on that right by
mandatory seat belt laws. This Comment attacks Pennsylvania's
statute by analyzing the law's effect on the constitutional rights of a
defendant in a motor vehicle suit when the plaintiff failed to wear a
seat belt.

Initially, this Comment traces the development of the seat-belt
309.2 (Supp. 1990); WASH, REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.688 (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. § 347.48
(1989). Of these jurisdictions, twenty strictly prohibit, by statute, the admissibility of seat belt
use or nonuse. They are: California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. O'Grady, Minnesota's Seat Belt
Evidence Gag Rule: Antiquated and Unfair in Crashworthiness Cases, 15 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 353, 375-78 (1989).
7. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581 (Purdon Supp. 1990). The statute provides, in pertinent part: "(2) Except for children under four years of age and except as provided in paragraph I [dealing with child safety restraints], each driver and front seat occupant of a passenger car . . . operated in this Commonwealth shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened
safety seat belt system." Id. at § 4581(a)(2).
8. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581 originally included the duty of a parent or legal
guardian of a child to fasten that child in a safety restraint. Act of Nov. 1,1983, Pub. L. 195
No. 53, § 4581, 1983 Pa. Laws 195 (amended 1987).
9. Ackerman, Pa. Seat-Belt Law Impacts Automobile Injury Litigation, Pa. L.J. Rep.,
Jan. 18, 1988, at 3, col. 1. The ten dollar fine provision is set forth in 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 4581(b) and states, in pertinent part, that anyone who violates the duty to wear a seat belt
"commits a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $10. No
persons shall be convicted of a violation of subsection (a)(2) unless the person is also convicted
of another violation of this title which occurred at the same time."
10. Ackerman, supra note 9. See, e.g., People v. Kohrig, 113 II1. 2d 384, 498 N.E.2d
1158 (1986); Wells v. State, 130 Misc. 2d 113, 495 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985), affd, 134 A.D.2d
874, 521 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1987).
II. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(e) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
12. "The seat belt defense precludes an automobile accident victim from recovering for
injuries which would have been prevented had he/she worn a seat belt." Ackerman, The Seat
Belt Defense Reconsidered: A Return to Accountability in Tort Law?, 16 N.M. L. REV. 221,
222 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939) (state's regulation of
highway is a valid exercise of police power and is necessary to promote safety of people traveling through the state); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 215 Pa. Super. 444, 258 A.2d 885 (1969)
(creation of a motorcycle helmet use law was proper exercise of police power).
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defense. The Comment further sets forth the argument that subsection (e) of the Pennsylvania statute 4 violates a defendant's federal
and state due process and equal protection rights. The Comment
concludes with suggestions as to how the statute could be revamped
to be both equitable and constitutional.
I1. Background
Before 1987, the viability of the seat belt defense was a question
decided exclusively by the judiciary without a legislative mandate. In
the late seventies, the first cases that squarely addressed the seat belt
defense were decided by federal district courts in Pennsylvania.
In Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 5 the District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, while not imposing a common law duty on the public to wear seat belts, allowed the defendant
to submit evidence showing that the plaintiff's injuries were aggravated by failing to wear an available seat belt."6 To substantiate the
claim of avoidable consequences,' 7 the court held that the defendant
must support that claim with competent proof that the extent of injury was caused solely by the failure to wear a seat belt.' 8 The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Benner v. Interstate Container Corp.,' 9 also held that non-use of a seat belt may
be used as evidence to prove a failure to mitigate damages."z In addition, the court required that the jury be instructed that only unreasonable non-use of a seat belt could be considered when determining
whether the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages.'
In 1978, the viability of the seat-belt defense was first tested in
Pennsylvania's Superior Court. Parise v. Fehne12 addressed the issue of whether failure to use a seat belt constituted evidence of contributory negligence. 23 The superior court recognized the split of authority in other jurisdictions 2' and refrained from adopting a version
14. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of this subsection.
15. 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
16. Id. at 871.
17. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
18. 400 F. Supp. at 873-74.
19. 73 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
20. Id. at 504-05.
21. Id.
22. 267 Pa. Super. 79, 406 A.2d 345 (1979).
23. Id. at 80, 406 A.2d at 346. The issue of negligence was based on contributory negligence rather than comparative negligence because the comparative negligence statute, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1990), was not in effect at the time of the accident.
24. At the time this case was tried, three states (Illinois, New York, and Wisconsin)
recognized that a plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt may be admissible to show failure to
mitigate damages. Several other states (including Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas,
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of the defense until a suitable case was presented.2 5 The court decided that Parise was not a suitable case because the justices were
unpersuaded by the argument that it is "in the realm of common
knowledge that seat belts restrain sudden forward motion." 2 Nonetheless, the court explicitly stated that its decision did not foreclose
the potential use of a seat-belt defense in future cases.27 The Parise
court cited a New Jersey Superior Court case28 and reasoned that it
"might have allowed the defendant a seat belt defense if he had introduced expert testimony showing a relationship between the plaintiff's injuries and his failure to use a seat belt." 29
In 1986, the Pennsylvania Superior Court once again faced the
issue of the seat belt defense but arrived at a contrary conclusion on
the role of expert testimony. In McKee v. Southeast Delco School
District,3" the court decided whether a van driver had a duty to restrain child passengers by using the available seat belts. 3' The court
believed at that time that it was "common knowledge that seat belts
are effective safeguards against injury to occupants of motor vehicles." 2 The court reasoned that a jury could find that a failure to
restrain an occupant is a breach of the driver's duty to use reasonable care.3 3
Parise and McKee can be reconciled since the critical distinction between the two cases was the complexity of causation.3 4 In McKee, there was no collision. Therefore, the failure to wear a seat belt
did not exacerbate the injuries, but rather was the direct cause of
35
them.
Both Parise and McKee charted the course for later cases
within the Commonwealth that decided whether the failure to wear
North Carolina, and Washington) rejected any version of the seat belt defense. Still other
jurisdictions were waiting for a suitable case in which to rule on the validity of the defense.
Parise, 267 Pa. Super. at 82-83, 406 A.2d at 347 (citations omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 82, 406 A.2d at 346-47.
27. Id. at 82, 406 A.2d at 347.
28. Id. (citing Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967)).
29. Parise v. Fehnel, 267 Pa. Super. 79, 83, 406 A.2d 345, 347.
30. 354 Pa. Super. 433, 512 A.2d 28 (1986).
31. Id. Cheryl McKee, plaintiff, suffered injuries to her mouth and jaw when she was
thrown from her seat as the driver of the van was forced to stop suddenly in order to avoid a
collision with another vehicle. Id. at 433, 512 A.2d at 28.
32. McKee, 354 Pa. Super. at 437, 512 A.2d at 29.
33. Id. The court also took into account two other factors. First, the school district had
instructed the defendant that children riding in its vans were to be placed in seat restraints.
Also, the defendant had instructed the drivers of the vans that seat belts were to be used. Id.
34. Rider v. Yana, Civil Litig. L. Section Newsletter, Dec. 2, 1987 at 4 (York County,
Oct. 30, 1987).
35. Id.
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a seat belt qualified as contributory negligence. In Gaerttner v.
Saloum,3 6 a case tried less than a year after McKee, the Erie
County Common Pleas Court found the dicta in both Parise and
McKee particularly instructive.3 7 The Gaerttnercourt realized that it
faced an issue that neither Parise nor McKee directly addressed."a
Nevertheless, the court noted that the superior court in both Parise
and McKee had taken judicial notice that seat belts are effective3"
and that failure to utilize them can constitute a breach of reasonable
care. 40 Thus, the court held that, given proper and competent proof,
the seat belt defense would be appropriate.4 1
In Turner v. Scaife,4 2 the Lycoming County Common Pleas
Court reached a conclusion similar to that of the Gaerttner court.
The Turner court held that it could not prevent the defendant, as a
matter of law, from presenting evidence of the plaintiff's failure to
use a seat belt to demonstrate a breach of reasonable care because
Pennsylvania's appellate courts had not specifically ruled on the issue. 43 The court cautioned the defendant that expert testimony
would be required to prove that the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat
belt was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.4 4
Thus, until the enactment of the mandatory seat-belt law, the
majority of lower courts in the state were willing to accept and apply
the seat belt defense.4 5 Furthermore, with the exception of a McKee
scenerio when there was no collision involved, the courts were unanimous in requiring that expert testimony be used to substantiate the
defense. Nevertheless, the legislature endeavored to invalidate the
defense with little explanation as to its motive.
36. 70 Erie L.J. 65 (1986).
37. Id. at 66.
38. Neither the Parise nor the McKee court found it necessary to address the seat belt
defense issue to reach its decision. Parise opted to save the issue for another, more suitable
case. Parise v. Fehnel, 267 Pa. Super. 79, 83, 406 A.2d 345, 347 (1979). The McKee court
ruled that, given the factual scenario, the defense had no role in the case. McKee v. Southeast
Delco School Dist., 354 Pa. Super. 433, 437, 512 A.2d 28, 29 (1986).
39. Gaertner, 70 Erie L.J. at 67.
40. Id.
41. Id. The court explained its position by stating that it "ha[d] not tossed a coin but
rather, ha[d] tried to delve into what is meant by the appellate courts' decisions . . . . [T]he
appellate courts are cognizant of the safety requirement of a seat belt . . . .This court cannot
close its eyes to the obvious actions of the courts and legislatures." Id.
42. 17 Lyc. 60 (1987).
43. Id. at 63.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Orner v. Orner, Civil Litig. L. Section Newsletter, Jan. 1988 at 10 (York
County, Jan. 15, 1988); Walters v. Walters, 20 Crawford Co. L.J. 3 (1987); Campbell v. Peck,
No. 82-11258 (Montgomery Co. Dec. 18, 1984) (jury found plaintiff to be 40% negligent
after defendant's expert testified that the hyperextension injury plaintiff suffered had occurred
after she hit the windshield).
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On November 23, 1987, the legislature amended section 4581 of
title 75,46 which required drivers and front seat passengers to wear
seat belts.47 Subsection (e) of the amendment provides that:
In no event shall a violation or alleged
chapter be used as evidence in a trial of
shall any jury in a civil action be instructed
constitute or could be interpreted by them

violation of this subany civil action; nor
that any conduct did
to constitute a viola-

tion of this subchapter; nor shall failure to use a

. .

.safety belt

system be considered as contributory negligence nor shall failure
to use such a system be admissible as evidence in the trial of any
48
civil action.

The amendment took effect immediately and inflicted a mortal
wound to the seat belt defense in cases arising after its enactment.
The enactment of the amendment, specifically its logic and validity, has been a source of great controversy among members of
Pennsylvania's defense bar. Only after detailed analysis do these inconsistencies become apparent.
III.

Equal Protection Analysis

This Comment's first contention is that subsection (e) of the
mandatory seat belt law violates the equal protection guarantees of
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.4 9 Although the Pennsylvania Constitution does not have an express equal protection clause,5 0 it contains
implicit equal protection guarantees that are sufficiently similar in
meaning and purpose to the fourteenth amendment to warrant identical treatment when analyzing the constitutionality of legislation.5
46. The 1987 amendment rewrote subsection (a) to incorporate the mandatory seat belt
provision and subsection (b) to include the penalty. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(a),
(b) (Purdon Supp. 1990). The amendment also rewrote subsection (e) to include safety belt
system use violations from being used in civil actions. See id. § 4581(e). Finally the amendment included subsection (h) on insurance. See id. § 4581(h).
47. Id. § 4581(a)(2).
48. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(e) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
49. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ I.
50. 7A PA. L. ENCYCLOPEDIA § 241 (Supp. 1989).
51. PA. CONST. art. Ill, § 32. ("The general Assembly shall pass no local or special law
in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law..."); PA. CONST. art. 1,§
26 ("Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person
the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any
civil right."); PA. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of
subjects . . .");PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (Exemptions and special provisions concerning taxation and finance).
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A.

Standard of Review

In cases based upon the fourteenth amendment's equal protection claims, the court must first determine the appropriate standard

of review to apply.5 2 The "rational basis" test,53 which is the most
lenient standard, is utilized when there are no suspect classifications 54 or fundamental rights5 5 involved. 56 The rational basis test re-

quires only that the challenged statute be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.57 At the other end of the spectrum is
the "strict scrutiny" test. The "strict scrutiny" test is applied when
reviewing statutes that affect fundamental rights or that contain suspect classifications. 8 This test requires that the statute promote a
compelling state interest while employing perfectly tailored, least restrictive means to accomplish that goal.5 '
Between the rational basis test and the strict scrutiny test is the
heightened scrutiny test.60 The heightened scrutiny test is applied
when a challenged statute affects important substantive rights or interests."1 Since the statute affects important substantive interests, the
classifications established by the statute must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 2 The
52. James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 312 Pa. Super. 512, 517, 459 A.2d 338,
341 (1983) rev'd on other grounds 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984).
53. The "rational basis" testrequires the means used by the legislature in putting a
statute in force to be rationally or reasonably related to the objective of that particular statute.
For a more in-depth analysis of the rational basis test as it applies to equal protection, see
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
54. "Suspect classifications" are those statutory classifications that are based on race,
alienage, national origin, or sex. For a more in-depth analysis, see Developments, supra note
53, at 1065.
55. "Fundamental rights" are those rights that have their origin in the express terms of
the United States Constitution or that are necessarily to be implied from those terms. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 607 (5th ed. 1979). For a more in-depth analysis, see Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 807
(1973).
56. See James, 312 Pa. Super. at 517, 459 A.2d at 341; Singer v.Sheppard, 464 Pa.
387, 402, 346 A.2d 897, 904-05 (1975).
57. Gillman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 63435, 369 A.2d 895, 897 (1977).
58. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights
found in the first amendment); Norris v. Wood, 336 Pa. Super. 305, 485 A.2d 817 (1984).
59. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
60. Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74, 515 A.2d 1358 (1986).
61. Id.
62. Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 400-1, 341 A.2d 441, 443 (1975). The Moyer court
used the heightened scrutiny test to review the exclusion of slander and libel actions once a
plaintiff or defendant has died. The court recognized that the guarantees of equal protection
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heightened scrutiny test should be applied to the Pennsylvania seat
belt law.
B. The Interest Requiring the Application of the Heightened Scrutiny Standard
The right to the seat belt defense is an important substantive
interest. In James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,6" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the heightened
scrutiny test to determine whether an individual's equal protection
rights were violated by a state statute. The statute required injured
plaintiffs to give notice to the secretary and the chief counsel of the
transportation board-within six months from the date of injury-of
any impending suit against the board.64 The supreme court concurred with the superior court's determination that the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right. 5 The
superior court had stated that the right to recover damages is a substantial property right both in monetary terms and in terms of the
injured person's physical well-being. 66 The court reasoned that, although statutory classifications that disproportionately burden only
some people are permitted under the equal protection clause,6 7 those
classifications are only valid if they pass the heightened scrutiny
test.6" If classifications that burden an individual's right to a cause of
action are only valid if they pass the heightened scrutiny test, then
of
classifications that burden an individual's defense to those causes
69
action should be afforded the benefit of the same standard.
An interest in a defense is similar to an interest in a cause of
action when viewed from the defendant's perspective. Although a
person has no right to a cause of action or a defense until that cause
do not prevent the right of the legislature to treat different classes of people differently. Equal
protection does deny the right to dispense different treatment to people placed into different
classes "on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the particular statute." Id.
63. 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984).
64. Id. at 137, 477 A.2d at 1303. The statute was 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2036 (repealed
1978). Subsequent legislation was passed requiring notice of claims to be served on state and
governmental entities within six months of injury or accrual of plaintiff's cause of action. See
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
65. James, 505 Pa. at 147, 477 A.2d at 1306.
66. James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 312 Pa. Super. 512, 518, 459 A.2d 338,
341-42 (1983), revd on other grounds, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984) (citing Hunter v.
Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 813, 539 P.2d 845, 848 (1975)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal. 2d 226, 230, 54 P.2d 712, 716 (1936) (a legislature may
not, under guise of regulating rules of evidence, deprive a party of his substantive right, such
as a good cause of action or a substantial defense).
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of action or defense has vested,7" that person retains an important
interest in the ability to obtain redress for injury through the continued availability of the cause of action or defense. Professor Laurence
Tribe describes an "important" interest as one having a "benefit vital to the individual." 7 1 One benefit vital to an individual is found in
Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 2 That article
states in pertinent part that: "All courts shall be open; and every
man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay." 73 Although Article I, section
11 does not prohibit either the courts or the legislature from abolishing or modifying a cause of action,'7 that ability should not be exercised without restraint. 75 Occasionally, societal conditions mandate
either the alteration of some substantive elements or the modification
of procedural prerequisites for a cause of action or defense. 76 There
is, however, a tremendous difference between imposing reasonable
procedural requirements and constructing an indestructable barrier
77
of immunity from liability.
Justice Larsen has pointed out this difference in a line of immunity cases. 78 He has argued that the distinction lies in real modifications in legislation versus artificial changes in result only. 79 The leg70. Carroll v. York, 496 Pa. 363, 373, 437 A.2d 394, 399 (1981)
ing); Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 399, 346 A.2d 897, 903 (1975).
71.

(Larsen, J., dissent-

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-31 (1978) (quoted in James v.

Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 505 Pa. 137, 146, 477 A.2d 1302, 1306 (1984)).
72. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
73. Id.
74. Carroll,496 Pa. at 373, 437 A.2d at 399; Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa.
270, 279-81, 382 A.2d 715 (1978); Singer, 464 Pa. at 399-400, 346 A.2d 897 (1975); Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899 (1955); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158,
168-169, 106 A. 238 (1919), affid., 260 U.S. 22 (1922). Although these cases state that the
legislature can abolish a cause of action, in his dissent in Carroll,Justice Larsen argued that it
is doubtful whether the legislature could abolish a cause of action in toto without substituting
some remedy. He asked whether the "legislature could abolish all causes of action for ... the
common law tort of trespass, leaving no viable, substituted remedy for injuries caused by any
of the various types of trespass?" Carroll v. York, 469 Pa. 363, 373, 437 A.2d 394, 399 (1981)
(Larsen, J., dissenting). He stated that the courts above had not addressed the issue squarely
and he doubted that the courts would reach that conclusion if they had confronted it. Id.
75. Carroll v. York, 496 Pa. 363, 374, 437 A.2d 394, 400 (1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Carroll, 496 Pa. at 374, 437 A.2d at 400; Lyles v. Commw. Dep't of Transp., 512
Pa. 322, 516 A.2d 701 (1986); Smith v. Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129, 516 A.2d 306 (1986);
James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 503 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984); Martin v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 466 A.2d 107 (1983); Dubree v.
Commw., 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
79. Carroll v. York, 496 Pa. 363, 377, 437 A.2d 394, 401 (1981) (Larsen, J.,
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islature cannot divide a cause of action into two causes of action
based on the status of the parties and then abolish the cause of action as to one of the parties.80 If an act causes a "legal" injury when
committed by one party, that same act is a "legal" injury when committed by another party."1 By setting up an immunity from liability,
the legislature does not modify or abolish an existing cause of action,
but instead denies access to the courts by establishing artificial distinctions between cases.82
The Pennsylvania seat belt legislation8 3 creates artificial distinctions and it burdens a defendant's important interest in open access
to the courts. The legislature has denied a remedy-in this case a
defense-that still retains a "legal" injury character and is otherwise
actionable. The statute provides that a driver or front seat passenger
has a duty to wear a safety restraint while operating a car in the
Commonwealth. 4 That provision is similar to the statute requiring
all motorcycle riders to wear protective headgear.8 5 A breach of either statutory duty would normally create an actionable defense of
negligence per se.86 The seat belt statute, however, creates an immunity that does not change a recognized cause of action, but instead
effectuates a complete denial of a "remedy by due course of law...
'87
and justice administered without . . . denial.
The immunity provided by the mandatory seat belt law does not
modify the elements or essential character of the cause of action for
negligence based on a plaintiff's failure to wear a safety device. It
merely sets out a statutory duty, the violation of which would normally be negligence per se, and shrouds the violator with the cloak of
immunity. As Justice Larsen wrote, "An immunity does no more,
and no less, than to close the door to suit for a particular cause of
action against a favored [party]." 8 8 Consequently, the statute severely impinges upon a defendant's important interest in open access
dissenting).
80. Id. at 378, 437 A.2d at 401-02 (relying on guidelines established in Freezer Storage
v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 46-48 and accompanying text.
84. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
85. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3525 (Purdon Supp. 1990). The statute states in pertinent part that "no person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle ...
unless he is wearing protective headgear which complies with standards established by the
department."
86. Vernon v. Stash, 367 Pa. Super. 36, 46, 532 A.2d 441, 446 (1987).
87. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 11.
88. Carroll v. York, 496 Pa. 363, 376, 437 A.2d 394, 401 (1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
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to the courts as provided under Article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution."9 After a court establishes that the seat belt legislation affects a defendant's important interests, the court must next
examine the objective of the statute.90
C. Object of the Legislation
The Vehicle Code is necessary to promote the safety of the people within the Commonwealth."' Undoubtably, the underlying purpose behind the mandatory seat belt law is to promote public safety
by encouraging people to use seat belts.92 Furthermore, the testimony given before .the House and Senate concerning the law reveals
that the congressmen were searching for a way to reduce the financial burden on the now defunct catostrophic loss fund (CAT fund). 9"
The CAT fund was created to pay the medical and rehabilitative
expenses of people who suffer from catastrophic injuries.9 4 The congressmen believed that mandatory seat belt use legislation would
89. Id. at 381, 437 A.2d at 403. Larsen also wrote that the court in Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), ruled that there are "no reasons
whatsoever" for immunities that are based solely on status of one of the parties. Id. Larsen
concluded that a strong argument may be made to apply the "strict scrutiny" standard to this
type of legislation since it is fundamental to the system that a person be allowed to seek
redress for substantial wrongs committed. Carroll, 496 Pa. at 381 n.9, 437 A.2d at 404 n.9.
For the sake of argument, this Comment will not take that position, but will instead apply the
heightened scrutiny analysis.
90. James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 312 Pa. Super. 512, 518, 459 A.2d 338,
342 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984).
91. Commonwealth v. Arnold, 215 Pa. Super. 444, 449, 258 A.2d 885, 887 (1969).
92. Representative Linton of Philadelphia, one sponsor of the amendment, asked the
members of the house to vote for the bill to "save lives in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." 70 LEGIS. J.-HouSE 1634 (1987) (statement of Rep. Linton). Furthermore, Representative Vroon, the co-sponsor of the amendment, stated:
The life which you will save if you buckle up is not something that may be
your own but will positively be your own, and the life that is affected by your
using a seatbelt is not just your own, but in the case of serious, terrible injury,
your reluctance to buckle up may effect your whole family and may affect you
for the rest of your life as well and make you a burden to your family and
society.
Id. at 1635.
93. Representative Chadwick of Bradford County stated:
I represent this body on the board of directors of the CAT Fund, and
as you know, we have some financial problems in the CAT Fund. We have unfunded liability that is running into the hundreds of millions of dollars that is
going to have to be paid off in the future, and one of the big reasons for that is
that we have a large number of claimants who were injured who were not wearing seat belts.
Id. at 1637.
94. A catastrophic loss is an injury exceeding $100,000 in medical and rehabilitative
expenses that arises out of the use and maintenance of a motor vehicle. TRIAL ADVOCACY
FOUND. OF PA., ANNUAL PENNSYLVANIA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW SEMINAR 1988, at 57
(1988).
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ease the strain on the CAT fund since statistics revealed that over
forty percent of the people enrolled in the CAT fund suffered from
head injuries9 5 that probably could have been prevented by the use
of seat belts. 6 Thus, the statute's overriding objective was to promote safety by coercing people to utilize seat belts.
D.

Identifying the Statutory Classification

The final step in equal protection analysis requires the identification of the classifications established by the statute.9 7 The classification created by the seat belt law is based upon the identity of the
plaintiff. The statute looks to whether the plaintiff who failed to
wear a safety device was either a front seat passenger or the driver
of the car that was struck by the defendant.9 8 Persons who fall
within either classification receive deferential treatment by gaining
immunity from liability for failing to wear the required safety
device.9 9
E. Heightened Scrutiny Analysis
As previously noted, the heightened scrutiny test requires that
the legislation's classification be reasonable and not arbitrary.' 00
Furthermore, that classification must have a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of the statute so that all persons similarly situated are treated equally. 1"'
Upon application, the seat belt statute fails to meet the demands of the heightened scrutiny standard. The statute falls short of
the standard because the classification established by the statute is
unreasonable. The classification arbitrarily divides a class of negligent tortfeasors when no apparent characteristic separates them.
The Vehicle Code creates the duty to wear a safety device in
95. 70 LEGIS. J.-HOUSE 1637 (1987) (statement of Rep. Chadwick). Representative
Chadwick stated that head and neck injuries occurred because automobile occupants were not
wearing their seat belts and hit the windshield. Id. One-half of all head injuries are caused by
auto accidents. Id. at 1636 (statement of Rep. McHale).
96. Ninety percent of all occupants killed in motor vehicle accidents were not wearing
seat belts. Moreover, 84% of those people enrolled in the CAT Fund were not wearing their
seat belts at the time of the accident. Id. Of all the serious injuries for which claims have been
made, not one serious head injury claim was made when the automobile occupant was wearing
a seat belt. 74 LEGIS. J.-SENATE 1383 (1987) (statement of Sen. Holl).
97. James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 312 Pa. Super. 512, 518, 459 A.2d 338,
342 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984).
98. 75 PA. CoNsT. STAT. ANN. § 4581(a) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
99. Id. § 4581(e).
100. Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74, 515 A.2d 1358 (1986).
101. Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 400-01, 341 A.2d 441, 443 (1975).
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other situations and violation of that duty is negligence per se. For
example, the courts often draw analogies between mandatory seat
belt laws and mandatory motorcycle helmet use laws. 102 Since the
two types of laws are conceptually similar in purpose and application,103 they should be treated similarly for liability purposes. They
are not.
Section 3525 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code1" 4 requires all
persons riding or operating a motorcycle within the Commonwealth
to wear protective headgear. 0 5 The statute is silent as to the admissibility into evidence of a violation of this statute, and therefore
would be negligence per se.' 06 Yet the legislature, in enacting the
seat belt law, created a distinction between seat belt and motorcycle
helmet use laws where none truly exists.
A hypothetical might aid in understanding why no rational distinction exists. Suppose that D, driving a car, crashes into M who is
operating a motorcycle without wearing protective headgear. As a
result of the accident, M suffers a severe head injury that could have
been prevented if he had worn his helmet. In a suit between M and
D, D would be able to claim that M was contributorily negligent
because M failed to wear his helmet. 10 7 That failure would be negligence per se. l08
Now consider the same hypothetical except that D crashes into
P who is driving a car without wearing his protective seat belt. P,
like M, suffers a severe head injury that also could have been prevented if P had worn his seat belt. Nevertheless, in a suit between P
and D, D is barred from claiming contributory negligence even
though P violated a statutory duty.'09 These two scenerios are substantially similar yet the outcomes are inexplicably different. Consequently, the seat belt statute lacks the rational classification for
treating automobile drivers and passengers differently.
Moreover, even if the statutory classification is reasonable, that
classification lacks a substantial relation to the object of the legislation. As stated earlier, the objective of the legislation is to encourage
102. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
103. State v. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1989) (legislation requiring motorcycle headgear is conceptually similar to seat belt legislation); Comment, The Minnesota
Mandatory Seat Belt Law: No Right to be Reckless?, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 238 (1987).
104. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3525 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
105. Id. § 3525(a).
106. See Vernon v. Stash, 367 Pa. Super. 36, 46, 532 A.2d 441, 446 (1987); Loughhead,
supra note I at 5.
107. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(e) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
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people to wear safety restraints. l0 The classification, however, discourages seat belt use since the liability that would otherwise be imposed for violating a statutory duty is absolved. It is questionable
whether this categorization could satisfy even a rational relation
standard.11 1 If the legislature was truly interested in coercing people
to wear safety restraints, the statute would hold people responsible
for failing to wear them by decreasing the amount recoverable for
the injuries that are caused by that failure. If people realized that
they would be accountable for their own injuries caused by the failure to wear a safety belt, they would probably make the effort to
buckle-up.
Holding a person liable for injuries caused by his failure to use
a seat belt does not penalize that person for breaching his statutory
duty. Such a statute simply allows an equitable allocation of liability
since it places reponsibility for injuries with the person(s) who
caused them. The statute in its present form is counterintuitive to
legislative objectives.
It is illogical to assume that people who do not want to wear
seat belts will use seat belts when they are aware that they will not
be held responsible for any injuries that could have been prevented
by the use of that seat belt. In addition, there is no motivation to
wear seat belts when people are allowed to seek compensation for
their injuries from the opposing party. It is apparent, therefore, that
public and private interests are grossly disproportionate." 2 The pub110. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
11l. Some members of the legislature questioned the law's validity. For example, Representative Godshall of Montgomery County said, when referring to a recent accident in his
county:
Under the mitigation of damages, the [insurance] company showed and
proved that the woman [who had broken her neck when she hit the windshield],
if she had been wearing her seatbelt, would have suffered no injuries at all.
There was a reduction in the award because of that. This bill would take that
away, and . . . what we are saying in this bill is that you are again not responsible for your own actions. We are saying you must wear a seatbelt. At the same
time, if you do not, you cannot contribute to your own injuries through your own
actions. For this reason, I am opposing this bill.
70 LEGIS. J.--HOUSE 1638 (1987). Furthermore, Representative Heckler of Bucks County
stated, in reference to this provision:
Mr. Speaker, if that is the best we can do, I would hate to see the worst we
can do. I would suggest that many of the arguments against voting for this
amendment are now valid . . . . I would suggest that now is the time to wait,
now is the time to get good language that will mean something to the people of
this Commonwealth and then enact it.
Id. at 1641.
112. This conclusion was reached by the James court. The court was unwilling to determine which interest outweighed the other but decided to determine whether the two interests
were grossly disproportionate. James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 312 Pa. Super. 512,
520, 459 A.2d 338, 343 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984).
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lic interest in making people fasten their seat belts is poorly served
by the statute.1 13 Conversely, the defendant's private interest in having his suit equitably tried, with liability for injury placed on the
party responsible, is severely hampered. Given the statutory inequities favoring the people who do not wear seat belts, it is hardly rational that those people will be motivated to buckle-up.
Those same inequities also cause the seat belt statute to fail the
final element of the heightened scrutiny test. That element requires
statutory classifications to treat all persons similarly situated alike." '
The mandatory seat belt law violates this provision. In a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff fails to wear a seat belt, the court
confronts circumstances in which the plaintiff and the defendant are
similarly situated.'1 5 Both plaintiff and defendant are under a duty,
albeit duties with different sources. The defendant's duty is a common law duty to use reasonable care." 16 The plaintiffs duty is statutory and requires him to use safety restraints." 7 Although both
plaintiff and defendant have violated their respective duties, the defendant is disparately treated since the breach of his duty will be
used against him, but the plaintiff will be immunized from liability
for his breach.
An additional disparity exists under the seat belt law. As stated
earlier, both the motorcycle helmet law"' and the seat belt law were
promulgated to ensure public safety." 9 Since both statutes set out a
legislative duty to use safety devices, 21 the consequences for not
wearing those devices should be the same. If a motorcyclist is held
liable for the injuries caused by his failure to heed the mandate, so
For additional analysis, see infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text; see infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
114. Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 400-01, 341 A.2d 441, 443 (1975).
115. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this argument when the delay damages
rule was challenged in Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 61, 436
A.2d 147, 156 (1981). However, the seat belt issue is distinguishable. The Laudenberger court
believed that the plaintiff had suffered an injury and committed no wrong while the defendant
suffered no harm but committed a wrongful act. Id. The seat belt situation is different. Both
the plaintiff and the defendant have breached a duty by committing a wrongful act. Here, the
defendant suffers harm because he will be held liable for the injuries he did not commit.
116. Kukowski v. Kukowski, 385 Pa. Super. 172, 560 A.2d 222 (1989) ("the operator of
a motor vehicle must at all times exercise reasonable care under the circumstances . . .");
D.M. Bare Paper Co. v. Steward, 205 Pa. Super. 286, 208 A.2d 890 (1965); Saar v. Saar, 143
Pa. Super. 528, 17 A.2d 745 (1941).
117. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(a), (b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
118. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3525 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
119. See supra notes 91-96, 103 and accompanying text.
120. For motorcycles, see 75 PA. CONS.STAT. ANN. § 3525; for automobile passengers,
see 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581.

95

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL

1990

too should the driver or passenger of an automobile be held responsible for his injuries caused by the failure to fasten his seat belt.
After analyzing the mandatory seat belt law under the heightened scrutiny standard, the constitutional flaws within the statute
are evident. The classification designed by the statute is unreasonable and illogical and has a less than substantial relation to the statute's safety objective. The statute merely creates a haven from liability for automobile passengers and drivers who fail to wear seat belts
while it holds other people with similar duties responsible for their
actions. For these reasons, Pennsylvania's mandatory seat belt law
violates the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause121 and the guarantees of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 2'
IV.

Due Process Analysis

This Comment's second contention is that subsection (e) of the
mandatory seat belt law violates defendants' substantive due process
rights, 12 even though the legislation was passed pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Legislature's exercise of its police powers.1 24 Although
no cases specifically address the seat belt issue from a defendant's
standpoint, 1 25 an analogy comparing the provision in question with
other similar provisions will demonstrate the diminished validity of
the statute.
In 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a rule of
civil procedure that had burdened defendants' interests 26 just as the
seat belt legislation does today. Rule 238,127 better known as the delay damages rule,"2 8 assessed prejudgment interest against a defendant if a plaintiff received a jury verdict in excess of any settlement
offer made by the defendant prior to trial.' 29 The rule was promul121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
122. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
123. As applied to statutes, due process requires that statutes are applied generally, that
they similarly affect the rights of all people, and that no special legislation affects the rights of
certain individuals but not others. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 789 (1989).
124. "Police power" is the broad term encompassing the state legislature's ability to
create laws that promote public health, safety, and welfare. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,
31 (1885); State v. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1989).
125. In fact, the Pennsylvania seat belt law has not yet been challenged.
126. Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehab. Center, 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986).
127. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987) (repealed 1988).
128. Id.
129. Rule 238 stated that delay damages should be awarded to the plaintiff against all
defendants found liable unless the defendant made a written offer of settlement prior to trial
and kept it open until trial began. If the plaintiff rejected the offer and did not recover a
verdict in excess of 125 percent of the offer, no damages for delay would be awarded for the
period after the date the offer was made. Id. at 238(c), (e).
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gated by the supreme court' to clear dockets of cases in which
there were unreasonable refusals to make fair settlements.' In developing the rule, the court reasoned that no unfairness resulted to
the wrongdoer because he profited from his refusal to settle and to
compensate for the injury he caused.' 2 In practice, however, the rule
was unjust because it assessed the interest against the defendant regardless of whether the delay was caused by him, the plaintiff,13 3 or

even the court itself.' 4 The rule deviated from its equitable mission
by penalizing defendants when the delay was beyond the defendant's
control.
Cognizant of the rule's tendancy to punish a defendant without
a showing of fault,' 35 the court suspended the rule. 36 The justices in
Craig stated that a rule cannot punish a party for acts not caused by
him and still be consistent with the due process clause. 37 Additionally, a rule cannot punish the defendant merely for being named a
defendant in litigation because that punishment would be inconsis3
tent with the normal precepts of justice. 1
In its final analysis, the court ruled that the ends sought by
Rule 238' a3 ran "too tight a gauntlet through Due Process, by denial
of a forum to assess fault for the delay sought to be avoided.' 40 The
rule, though designed to be an equitable tool, " ' had erected an irrebuttable presumption that the defendant was always to blame for
130. The court created the rule by employing its power to "prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts . . . if such rules are consistent with
this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant
. . PA. .CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
131. Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehab. Center, 512 Pa. 60, 64, 515 A.2d 1350, 1352
(1986)..
132. Id.; Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 61, 436 A.2d
147, 156 (1981).
133. Babich v. Pittsburgh & New England Truck. Co., 386 Pa. Super. 482, 563 A.2d
168 (1989) (citing DeLuca v. Smaller, 385 Pa. Super. 546, 561 A.2d 810 (1989)).
134. Although the court system can also cause delay, the new delay damages rule, PA.
R. Civ. P. 238, does not take that into account. The provision only considers delay caused by
either the plaintiff or the defendant. Any delay not caused by either party will still be assessed
against the defendant. See Miller v. Wise Business Forms, 381 Pa. 236, 553 A.2d 443 (1989);
King v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 383 Pa. Super. 420, 557 A.2d 11 (1989).
135. The Explanatory Comment to the old delay damages rule stated that experience
would indicate whether the rule served its intended purpose, Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehab.
Center, 512 Pa. 60, 63 n.4, 515 A.2d 1350, 1353 n.4 (1986).
136. Id. at 63, 515 A.2d at 1353.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.'
140. Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehab. Center, 512 Pa. 60, 65, 515 A.2d 1350, 1353
(1986).
141. The rule was designed to be an equitable tool since it compensated the plaintiff for
an additional loss suffered due to the defendant's unreasonable refusal to return the plaintiff to
status quo.
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delay damages.' 42 The court recognized that the presumption was
not always the truth1 43 and questionable presumptions cannot be irrebuttable when a person is ultimately penalized based upon that
presumption.""
Although Rule 238 was promulgated by the judiciary,' 45 the
same analysis can be applied to the legislatively created seat belt
law. Just as Rule 238 punished a party based on his status,14 6 the
seat belt legislation punishes a party who has the unfortunate experience of being involved in an accident with a person who was not
wearing his safety restraint. The court makes no determination of
fault.' 7 Rather, the statute punishes every defendant regardless of
culpability. The legislature created a rule that the Craig court said
could not be created and still remain consistent with due process. 4 8
In fact, the seat belt statute is even more unfair than the delay damages rule because, under Rule 238, a defendant could escape prejudgment interest by making a reasonable offer.' 4 9 Under the seat
belt law, a defendant has no escape from liability. Since the defendant has no ability to defend against the liability imputed to him, the
seat belt law "runs too tight a gauntlet through due process."'150 The
seat belt statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that all liability
lies with the defendant. This is simply not true.' 5 ' Consequently, this
presumption should not be irrebuttable. 5 2

142. Craig, 512 Pa. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
146. The rule was aimed solely at defendants. See Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehab.
Center, 512 Pa. 60, 64, 515 A.2d 1350, 1352 (1986).
147. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(a), (e) (Purdon Supp. 1990). It would be
interesting to hypothesize the result that would be reached if the plaintiff happened to be a
back seat passenger as opposed to a driver or front seat passenger. Possibly the defendant
could argue that, although the statute is silent as to the duty of a back seat passenger to wear
a seat belt, that person still retains a common law duty to wear a seat belt that was in effect
prior to the amendment. In fact, the proposition that there is a common law duty to wear seat
belts is supported by both McKee v. Southeast Delco School Dist., 354 Pa. Super. 433, 512
A.2d 28 (1986) and by Stouffer v. Commonwealth, 562 A.2d 922 (Pa. Commw. 1989). The
question is, if the statute is silent as to the admissibility of a back seat passenger's violation of
a common law duty, can the back seat passenger be held liable for failure to mitigate damages
or for comparative negligence?
148. See Craig, 512 Pa. at 63, 515 A.2d at 1353.
149. See.PA. R. Civ. P. 238(e).
150. Craig, 512 Pa. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353.
151. The members of the Pennsylvania Legislature prove that fact through the CAT
Fund statistics. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
152. See Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehab. Center, 512 Pa. 60, 65, 515 A.2d 1350,
1353 (1986); see infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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A. The Seat Belt Legislation and the Irrebuttable Presumption
Doctrine
Although the viability of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
in Pennsylvania is unclear,"' 3 the Craig court apparently recognized
its significance. 154 Consequently, a review of the seat belt law under
the doctrine might be helpful. In all prior cases involving the irrebuttable presumption doctrine,1 55 the statute in question placed a burden on individuals who had certain common characteristics.15 6 A
characteristic would form the basis of a basic fact.' 57 From that basic fact, a presumed fact would be extrapolated . 58 These cases ruled
that if the basic fact did not imply the presumed fact universally and
necessarily, then the statute's irrebuttable presumption violated due
process."'
The most analogous situation to the seat belt legislation occurred in Gurmankin v. Costanzo."' In Gurmankin, the Philadelphia School District had a policy that prevented blind applicants
from taking the Philadelphia Teachers Examination.'' The Third
Circuit ruled that the school district's policy denied Gurmankin the
opportunity to present evidence of her competency and qualifications. "6' 2 Since she was denied an opportunity to rebut the presump153. In Gondelman v. Commonwealth, 120 Pa. Commw. 624, 550 A.2d 814 (1988),
cert. denied sub nom Katz v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 146 (1989), the Commonwealth Court
stated that "[wle do not at this time make any decision as to the viability of the 'irrebuttable
presumption' doctrine...
" Id. at 638 n.15, 550 A.2d at 821 n.15.
154. See Craig, 512 Pa. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353.
155. The irrebuttable presumption doctrine emerged from a series of cases decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court from 1971 through 1974. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (statutes establishing irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the fifth and fourteenth amendments' due process clauses); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (statute requiring mandatory leave
for teachers in their fourth month of pregnancy created irrebuttable presumption that pregnant teachers were physically incapable to teach after the fourth month of pregnancy). The
Supreme Court limited application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine in those cases not
involving fundamental rights. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). This limitation does
not affect the application of the doctrine to seat belt cases. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. The seat belt cases would still be controlled by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S, 632 (1974).
156. Commonwealth v. Slater, 75 Pa. Commw. 310, 322, 462 A.2d 870, 876 (1983).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Slater, 75 Pa. Commw. at 316, 462 A.2d at 876-77 & n.15 (citing Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973)); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534, 1534-36 (1974).
160. 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
161. Id. at 185.
162. The Gurmankin court believed that LaFleur was controlling. Gurmankin, 556 F.2d
at 187. The court relied on Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Salfi to distinguish Salfi from LaFleur. Justice Rehnquist stated that the moving party in Salfi had an opportunity to present
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tion that her blindness made her incompetent to teach, Mrs.
Gurmankin was denied due process. 6 In effect, the court determined that the school district's policy was
not rationally related to
164
the goal of assuring teacher competency.
Similarly, the presumption created by the seat belt law is not
rationally related to the goal of compelling automobile passengers to
wear seat belts. That presumption is counterintuitive.165 Furthermore, the presumption that the defendant causes all of the plaintiff's
injuries is not universally true.'6 6 If the presumption was true, then
every action taken by the defendant that is a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff's injuries would also become the proximate cause of that
injury.' 6 7 There are situations, however, when the plaintiff's actions
evidence to show that she had met the requirements of the Social Security Act. Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). In response, the Gurmankin court stated that it was deciding
the question of the opportunity to present evidence of plaintiffs qualifications. Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1977). The court explained: "This is not a case challenging the competency requirements for teachers. It challenges the deprivation of the right to
present evidence of competency. It is quite different from Salfi, and the district court was
correct to regard it as [an issue] controlled by LaFleur." Id.
163. The school district's policy created an irrebuttable presumption, in violation of the
due process clause, that blind persons were not competent to teach sighted students.
Gurmankin, 556 F.2d at 187. Gurmankin had no fundamental right to take the test, but had
an expectation, based on state law, of being permitted to take the exam. The deprivation of
that right in an arbitrary manner violated due process. Id.
164. Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1980).
165. Statistical data for seat belt use shows that seat belt usage is on the rise:
Year

percent of people using seat belts

(based on accident data)
1982
1983
1985
1986
1987
1988

8.53
12.03
16.00
25.10
27.90 (pre-law)
42.50 (post-law)
53.40

Telephone interview with Lori Walkir, The American Academy of Pediatrics' Pa. Child Passenger Safety Project (Oct. 1989). The increase in seat belt use at the end of 1987 can be
attributed to the imposition of the $10 fine and not to the civil liability section.
166. See supra notes 95-96, 148.
167. This would have serious implications in a case with facts similar to McKee in which
there was no collision. For example, when a driver negligently swerves or quickly applies the
brakes, and the plaintiff suffers injuries upon impact with the windshield solely because he did
not wear a seat belt, a fault determination still would not be made. This is not a "second
collision" situation in which the cause of injuries can be attributed to either the initial collision
of the vehicles or the collision of the occupant with the windshield. The injuries in the hypothetical case can be attributed only to the collision of the occupant with the windshield. Therefore, the plaintiffs inaction can be viewed as a superseding, intervening cause and liability
should be apportioned accordingly. See, e.g., Campbell v. Peck, No. 82-11258 (Montgomery
Co. Dec. 18, 1984).
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are superceding, intervening causes of the injuries.16 s
In opposition, some commentators may argue that the presumption of liability is valid because it promotes speed and efficiency, conserves resources, and requires no expert testimony. 16 9 This reasoning
is faulty. The inference is inaccurrate and adversely effects the defendant's interests. 17 0 The time and resources saved do not justify the
detriment suffered by the defendant. Therefore, the irrebuttable presumption derived by the legislature must fall since it is neither rationally related to the state's safety goal nor universally true.
B. The Seat Belt Legislation as an Invalid Exercise of Police
Powers
State legislatures are endowed with the broad power to create
17
legislation that benefits the public's health, safety, and welfare.
That power does have limitations, however. The parameters of a
state's police power were drawn by the United States Supreme Court
in Lawton v. Steele.'72 To fall within those parameters, a state statute must appear to fulfill a requirement demanded by the general
public, not by a particular class of people. 173 Additionally, the legislative means must be reasonably necessary to meet that requirement.174 Simply stated, the test of a police power's validity is
75
whether the collective benefit outweighs the specific restraint.'
The first requirement of the police power test is clearly violated
by the Pennsylvania seat belt statute. The seat belt legislation does
not promote a benefit to the general public. In fact, it undermines
the public welfare while offering a benefit to a small group of people,
the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association. The plaintiff's bar receives the benefit of this statute since a trial attorney will not have to
counter a claim that his client brought about his own injuries due to
his own negligence. The statute relieves the plaintiff's burden of disproving the claim of contributory negligence, a claim that usually
168. A superseding, intervening cause is a force which, by its intervention, prevents the
actor from being liable for harm even though his negligence is a factor in bringing about that
injury. Hargrove v. Frommeyer & Co., 229 Pa. Super. 298, 323 A.2d 300, 304 (1974).
169. See Stewart v. Wohlgemuth, 355 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
170. Concerning inaccuracy, see supra notes 95-96, 165, 167 and accompanying text;
concerning adverse effects on defendant's interests, see supra notes 149-52, 155-59 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
172. 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. State v. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d 852, 857 (Iowa 1989); Benschoter v. Hakes, 232
Iowa 1354, 1361, 8 N.W.2d 481, 485 (1943).
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inflicts a mortal wound to plaintiffs' suits. Consequently, a plaintiffs
attorney will have a larger pool of viable cases that would not otherwise exist. Furthermore, the likelihood of plaintiffs' success is amplified because the large barrier of contributory negligence is shattered.
While the plaintiffs bar benefits from the seat belt law, the welfare of the general public suffers. Police powers are designed not
only to protect the public's physical safety, but also the public's financial safety.17 The seat belt law jeopardizes financial safety by
deleting the cost allocation process. The seat belt law forces the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for injuries that the plaintiff
could have prevented, regardless of the defendant's fault. As a result,
there could be inflated damage awards because the defendant must
provide compensation for the injuries caused by the plaintiff himself.
These increased damage awards could contribute to higher overall
insurance rates. 77 People who refuse to wear seat belts force insurance companies to increase rates due to the unpredictability of
whether its insured will be involved in accidents with unbelted automobile drivers or front seat passengers. This type of unpredictability
drains the state's financial welfare.
Additionally, the original costs to the public, sought to be
avoided, still remain. The direct and indirect costs to society that are
attributable to automobile accidents are staggering.' 7 8 These costs
are calculated from the moment of impact. From that moment, "society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment
compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and if
the injury causes permanent disability, may assume responsibility for
him and his family's continued subsistence."' 7 9 Thus, the seat belt
176. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d at 858 (quoting Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 33, 465 P.2d 118,
121 (1970)).
177. This point was brought out in the legislative debate. Representative Gallen of Berks
County said that:
[olne of those things contributing to the high cost of automobile insurance
is the unrealistic awards being made by juries . . . . [1If a person cannot defend
himself as far as damages are concerned by letting the court know that the person failed to use proper precaution himself, , .. we are going to have nothing
but a continued escalation of insurance rates . . . . [O]nce again, trial lawyers
have their nose in our business.
70 LEGIS. J.-HOUSE 1637 (1987).
178. In 1977, the costs of wage losses, medical expenses, insurance administration, and
property damage amounted to $30.5 billion dollars. In 1978, the cost of motor vehicle accidents was $34.2 billion. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d at 858-59 (quoting Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to the Seat Belt Issues, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217, 222 (1980)).
179. State v. Hartog, 440 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Iowa 1989) (quoting Simon v. Sargent, 346
F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass.), affd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)).
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law compounds these financial problems. The law is ineffective in
compelling people to wear seat belts and in holding them responsible
for failing to wear seat belts.
Moreover, the specific restraint on the defendant' 8 contributes
to the overall detriment of society. The defendant is restrained from
alleging contributory negligence as a defense to the plaintiff's claim.
To the defendant personally, this reflects an encroachment on his
interst in open courts."' The restraint also forces the defendant to
accept responsibility for injuries he may not have caused. To society,
the legal restraint exacerbates the financial problem that the law
sought to resolve. The restraint on the defendant acts as an incentive
for would-be plaintiffs to not wear a seat belt. The plaintiff is free to
act irresponsibly and pass on the cost to the defendant and to society
as a whole.
Under both elements of the police power test, the seat belt statute falls short. The statute fails because it puts the blame- on the
wrong party. By holding the defendant responsible for the plaintiff's
actions, the legislature gives the plaintiff permission to ignore legislative mandate and to be compensated for disregarding it. Society, instead of receiving a physical and financial safety benefit, receives the
burden of caring for careless individuals.
V.

Recommendations

As stated earlier, this Comment's purpose is not to undermine
mandatory seat belt use statutes in general. Mandatory use statutes
are very beneficial to society because they promote both financial
and physical well being. The most equitable way to achieve those
goals is to hold people responsible for their own inaction. That responsibility can take one of two forms, mitigation182 or comparative
negligence. 183
A. Mitigation
Mitigation, which is similar to the avoidable consequences
rule,"' is the most common basis for use of the seat belt defense.'8 5
180.

75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4581(e) (Purdon Supp. 1990).

181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
Professors Prosser and Keeton have stated that the plaintiff's duty to mitigate dam-

ages is equivalent to the doctrine of avoidable consequences. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON,

LAW OF TORTS § 65 (5th ed. 1984). Although traditionally these theories were applied to postaccident conduct, the New York Court of Appeals recognized in Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d

444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974), that a seat belt affords the plaintiff an ordi-
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Under the mitigation theory, a plaintiff cannot recover for any injury
that could have been prevented if he had worn a seat belt.""6 The
mitigation theory is distinguishable from contributory negligence
since the defendant is still liable for some damages, unless the plaintiff is one hundred percent negligent.1 87 The defendant's liability is
based on the plaintiffs injuries that could not be avoided by the use
of a seat belt and, therefore, the failure to use a seat belt was not a
cause of those injuries.18 8
Opponents of this application of the mitigation doctrine argue
that the plaintiff is not responsible for the accident and should not be
responsible for the injuries he suffers. 18 9 Nevertheless, manufacturers
of automobiles have been held responsible for the aggravation of the
plaintiff's injuries under a "crashworthy" theory.190 That theory
holds the manufacturer responsible for defects in the automobile that
cause or aggravate injuries even though those defects played no role
in causing the accident. 91
Opponents also object to the mitigation approach because they
believe that the plaintiff is under no duty to foresee the negligence of
others"9 2 and that the plaintiff is merely being punished for his actions after the fact. 9 ' In reality, traffic accidents are an inescapable
fact of life and the possibility of being involved in an accident is
probable and foreseeable. 4 Furthermore, the argument that the
plaintiff is being punished after the accident is countered by the argument that, in any tort action, a damage award has the same effect
on the defendant.' 9 5
The mitigation theory has merit, but there is a preferable apportionment theory available. Given that Pennsylvania is a comparative negligence state,'9 6 the use of comparative negligence theories
narily unavailable method to mitigate damages.
185. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text; Loughhead, supra note 1, at 3.
186. Ackerman, The Seat Belt Defense Reconsidered: A Return to Accountability in
Tort Law?, 16 N.M. L. REV. 221, 233 (Spring 1986).
187. Loughhead, supra note 1, at 3.
188. Ackerman, supra note 186, at 233.
189. Reisdorf v. Walker 128 Pitt. Legal J. 315 (Alleg. Co. 1980).
190. Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes and Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1982).
191. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), the court stated
that the risk of collision was foreseeable and that a car must be designed with that risk in
mind.
192. Loughhead, supra note 1, at 3.
193. Ackerman, Pa. Seat Belt Law Impacts Automobile Injury Litigation, Pa. L.J.
Rep., Jan. 18, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
194. Loughhead, supra note 1, at 4.
195. Ackerman, supra note 193, at 3, col.1.
196. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1990) states in part, that the
plaintiffs contributory negligence shall not be a bar to recovery where his "negligence was not
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and their applications would make the seat belt defense more
plausible.
B.

Comparative Negligence

Under Pennsylvania's comparative negligence system, a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt would reduce his damage recovery
for injuries that would not have occurred if he had worn his seat
belt.19 7 This approach obviously differs from the mitigation approach. First, the defendant remains liable for a portion of the plaintiff's injuries since the defendant's negligence is still a proximate
cause of those injuries. 9 a Second, this liability remains the defendant's unless the plaintiff's negligence is fifty percent or more. 99
The application of the comparative negligence doctrine requires
two apportionments by the trier of fact. First, the trier of fact must
apportion those injuries that were caused by the plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt."' Second, the trier of fact must apportion liability
between the plaintiff and defendant regarding those injuries. 0 '
Once again, the opponents of the comparative negligence doctrine argue that the plaintiff did not cause the accident and therefore
should not be liable for its result.20 2 However, Professors Prosser and
Keeton have asserted that if the plaintiffs damages are not reduced
by the amount that they have been "aggravated by his or her antecedent negligence, an artificial emphasis is placed upon the moment of
impact and the pure mechanics of causation. 2 03 Similarly, another
author suggests that a passenger's failure to use his seat belt is one
cause of the chain of events known as the "accident" leading to injury.2 04 Consequently, to understand the true mechanics of an accident, it must be viewed as a series of accidents with cause-in-fact
and proximate cause determinations to be made for each portion of
the entire event.
greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants . . . but any damages sustained . . . shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the
plaintiff."
197. The reduction is assessed if plaintiff's negligence did not contribute more than 50%
to the plaintiff's injuries.
198. Ackerman, supra note 186, at 234.
199. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
200. Ackerman, supra note 186, at 234.
201. Id.
202. See Reisdorf v. Walker, 128 Pitt. Legal J. 315 (Alleg. Co. 1980).
203. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 459 (5th ed. 1984).
204. Ackerman, supra note 193, at 3, col. I. Ackerman's view is that an accident is not
over until "after the vehicle has stopped tumbling down the ravine or the occupants have come
to rest against a utility pole after having been propelled through the windshield." Id.
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C. Practical Considerations
Several practical considerations must be taken into account
when utilizing the mitigation or comparative negligence approaches.
First, the seat belt defense is an affirmative defense2" 5 and the defendant has the burden of proof. Second, in order to meet this burden, the defendant must present expert testimony to substantiate his
claim.2"' The defendant must present an accident reconstruction expert with a background in automobile accident injuries or someone
similarly qualified to decipher which injuries were caused by the
plaintiff's failure to buckle-up.20 7 Certainly, apportionment by either
mitigation or comparative negligence under the seat belt defense is
not foolproof in exact distribution of liability. Nonetheless, apportionment in other comparative negligence cases is no closer to being
foolproof. The goal is to reach an equitable distribution of liability.
Although that goal is not easily attained, the court and the legislature should not blithely dismiss it as an impossible task.
VI.

Conclusion

At present, the Pennsylvania legislature has closed the book on
the seat belt defense. However, the method that the legislature employed to terminate the defense is fraught with constitutional
problems. The statute's arbitrary treatment of defendants who were
unlucky enough to be involved in an accident with a plaintiff who
decided to ignore the statutory mandate violates the basic precepts
of equal protection. Furthermore, by creating an irrebuttable presumption that is neither rational nor universal, the legislature has
severely hampered the defendant's due process guarantees. To ensure
equitable and effective results, the legislature must hold plaintiffs responsible for their own actions by revamping the statute and giving
the seat belt defense a new lease on life.
Richard B. Druby

205. Ackerman, supra note 193, at 4, col. 3-4.
206. See supra notes 15-21, 36-41 and accompanying text. However, this requirement
may not be necessary in a case with the same facts as those in McKee. See supra notes 30-35
and accompanying text.
207. Scientific reconstruction of highway accidents has become a much sought after litigation tool. Furthermore, with the advances in computer simulations that create animated
evidence, some computer-production companies can create a short simulation of a two car
collision for around $4000. Marcotte, Animated Evidence. Delta 191 Crash Re-Created
Through Computer Simulations at Trial, 75 A.B.A. J. 52, 56 (Dec. 1989).

